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 1 Introduction  
 
The four separate judgments by the learned Judges of Appeal in the matter of 
De Gree v Webb1 signifies to the reader the contentious terrain that inter-
country adoptions has become in South African law. The first part of this 
contribution examines the legal conundrum within which we are trying to 
facilitate inter-country adoptions and the second examines the best interests of 
the child principle against the backdrop of the judgments in the De Gree matter.    
 
2  De Gree v Webb considered  
 
The facts of the case are that the appellants, an American couple of African-
American descent had been trying since 2005 to adopt baby R, who was found 
a few days after her birth abandoned in a bucket under a tree in the 
Roodepoort area. R was taken to a shelter, ‘Baby Haven’, run by the first and 
second respondents, American citizens, now resident in South Africa, and who 
since January 2005, have been appointed the foster parents of R. The issue 
before the court is not the suitability of the appellants to adopt the child as it is 
clear that they are eminently suitable. The issue is really whether the procedure 
to secure the removal of the child from the Republic under the sanction of a 
custody and guardianship order from the High Court is indeed the best route to 
follow in the circumstances. The alternative route would have been to secure  
 
 
*  Director, Legal Administration, KZN Regional Office, Department of Justice and  
Constitutional Development. The author’s views are her own and do not reflect that of the 
Department.   
1   De Gree v Webb 2007 SCA 87 (RSA). Hereafter referred to as the De Gree case.  
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an inter-country adoption order via the Children’s Court. It must be conceded 
that the current legal position in regard to inter-country adoptions is a grey area, 
evidenced by the four separate judgments in the De Gree case.    
 
In addressing this issue, Theron AJA examined the adoption law and 
government’s policy in respect of inter-country adoption. The Child Care Act 74 
of 19832 does not make provision for inter-country adoptions. Prior to the 
decision of the Constitutional Court in Minister for Welfare and Social 
Development v Fitzpatrick and others,3 a South African child could only be 
adopted by a citizen and resident of South Africa. In the Fitzpatrick case, the 
prohibition against non-South Africans adopting a South African child was 
deemed to be inconsistent with section 28 of the Constitution.4 A practice had, 
in the interim, developed in South Africa wherein foreigners approach the High 
Court for orders of custody and guardianship in respect of young children that 
they wish to remove from the country. The judgment in Fitzpatrick did little to 
alter this practice.   
 
Theron AJA examines the international principles to which South Africa is 
bound by virtue of acceding to the Hague Convention in 2003 and by ratifying 
both the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC) in 
1995 and the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child in 2000.5 
Our Constitution decrees, however, that an international treaty shall not have 
effect until enacted into domestic legislation.6 The basic principles underlying 
these international documents provide important protection for children and 
cannot be disregarded solely, because our legislation giving effect to it is held 
up by the administrative process of drafting regulations in respect of same. 
Chapter 16 of the Children’s Act 38 of 2005,7 which was signed by the State  
 
2   Hereafter referred to as the Child Care Act.  
3   Minister for Welfare and Social Development v Fitzpatrick 2000 (3) SA 422 (CC). Hereafter referred to 
     as the Fitzpatrick case.  
4   Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996. Hereafter referred to as the Constitution.  
5   Par 11-12. 6  S 231 of the Constitution. 7  Hereafter referred to as the Children’s Act.  
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President but is not yet fully in effect,8 will give legal recognition to the Hague 
Convention and will establish the central authority for inter-country adoptions. 
The chapter on children’s courts is clear that all inter-country adoptions will be 
dealt with by the Children’s Courts. Section 24 of the Children’s Act is also clear 
that applications for guardianship may be made to the High Court and section 
25 limits such applications to South African citizens and provides that a 
guardianship application by a non-South African citizen must be regarded as an 
inter-country adoption.    
 
The learned judge’s examination of the provisions of the Children’s Act omitted 
to note that in terms of the definitions clause in the Children’s Act, trafficking in 
children means:   
 
  (a) the recruitment, sale, supply, transportation, transfer, harbouring or  
       receipt of children within or across the borders of the Republic –   
(i) by any means, including the use of threat, force or other 
forms of coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of 
power or the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to 
achieve the consent of a person having control of a child; 
or   
(ii) due to a position of vulnerability, for the purposes of 
exploitation; and  
 (b) includes the adoption of a child facilitated or secured through illegal  
     means.9   
  
In paragraph 19 the appellants contended that one of the reasons for choosing 
the High Court route was that there were no regulations in place to govern 
inter-country adoptions. The learned judge’s rejection of this contention must, 
with respect, be questioned. The factual position is that there are no existing 
regulations on inter-country adoptions pending the finalisation of the regulations 
in terms of the Children’s Act. Whilst judges may indeed feel bound by the dicta 
in the Fitzpatrick decision that the Child Care Act contains sufficient safeguards  
 
8 Procl R13 of 2007.  
9   Own emphasis.   
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for the protection of children generally, the fact remains that Child Care Act is 
silent on inter-country adoptions. The ‘inter-country adoption policy’ of the 
Department of Social Development unfortunately has no weight in the 
Children’s Court that is tasked with the legal function of granting or refusing an 
application for an inter-country adoption. The Department of Social 
Development has established an office of the Central Authority (as per the 
Hague Convention) that purports to regulate inter-country adoptions. In 
practice, social workers bring applications for inter-country adoptions before 
Commissioners of Child Welfare who are expected to work within the 
parameters of the Child Care Act that does not specifically provide for inter-
country adoptions.   
 
The dissenting judgment of Heher J captures this point:   
 
In my view any recognition of the ‘Interim Central Authority’ or the 
children’s court as an implementer of inter-country adoptions in 
relation to the present application would be inappropriate. The law 
must be applied as it is, not as it may become, however probable the 
prospect. There are of course no regulations in place to regulate 
inter-country adoptions because there is, at the present time, no 
statute which authorises the content or making of such regulations... 
 
10  Whilst the learned judge is correct that there is no act or regulations in 
place to administer inter-country adoptions, the Children’s Court must be 
regarded as a legal ‘implementer of inter-country adoptions’ following on the 
Fitzpatrick judgment.   
 
In Fitzpatrick, the Minister of Social Development requested the court to have 
the order of invalidity of section 18(4)(f) of the Child Care Act suspended for two 
years to enable the department to ensure that there would be adequate 
regulations and infrastructure in place to facilitate inter-country adoptions. The 
court refused to grant such suspension stating that the Children’s Court is well 
empowered to grant an inter-country adoption. With respect, the court did not 
consider that the process of inter-country adoptions cannot be equated with  
 
10  At par 51.   
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domestic adoptions and in the absence of legislation and regulations enabling 
the Hague Convention on Inter-Country Adoptions, children’s courts are 
operating in a vacuum. On a practical level, having to operate within the 
existing legal framework of the Child Care Act, and incorporate the 
expectations of the Fitzpatrick decision and the provisions of the new Children’s 
Act, which has as yet, no regulations, presents some serious legal challenges.   
 
 One of the challenges faced by the process of an inter-country adoption 
operating within the ambit of the provisions and regulations of the Child Care 
Act is the legality of the exchange of money in adoption matters. The Child 
Care Act states that no person may   
 
…give, undertake to give, receive or contract to receive any 
consideration, in cash or kind, in respect of the adoption of a child... 
 
11  – and makes it a criminal offence if this provision is contravened.    
 
The court in the Fitzpatrick case found that section 24 of the Child Care Act, is    
 
…designed to deter the practice of child trafficking, making the 
exchange of consideration in an adoption a criminal offence.    
 
A private adoption agency, Apostolic Faith Mission Welfare Council, in an 
article in the Star on April 28, 2002, is reported to have stated that they charge 
R16,000.00 for national and international adoptions. Abba Agency, in an 
interview with the author in 2005, indicated that they are affiliated to 72 
pregnancy crisis centres countrywide and all these centres send babies to them 
for placement. They indicated that they have working agreements with 
members of EuroDopt, an organisation that facilitates the inter-country 
adoptions between Convention countries. Their fees per inter-country adoption 
is 2200 Euro or R18,000.00 at the time. The Children’s Act does empower the 
Central Authority to authorise ‘working agreements’ between adoption agencies 
in South Africa and other Convention countries but the regulations governing  
 
11  S 24(1) and (2).   
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these working agreements are not yet in place. Furthermore, contrary to the 
protection envisaged by Fitzpatrick that section 24 of the Child Care Act is 
designed to deter the practice of child trafficking, money is changing hands in 
inter-country adoptions.  
 
The principle of subsidiarity, namely, that a child may only be placed for inter- 
country adoption after the possibilities for adoption in the country of birth have 
been considered and it is established that inter-country placement is in the 
child’s best interests, presents another challenge in the Children’s Court. This 
principle is found in article 21(b) of the UNCRC and article 17 of the United 
Nations Declaration on Social and Legal Principles Relating to the Protection 
and Welfare of Children. The Preamble to the Hague Convention states that –  
 
  inter-country adoption may offer the advantage of a permanent 
family to a child for whom a suitable family cannot be found in his or 
her state of origin.    
 
This principle is, unfortunately, not stated anywhere in the Child Care Act. 
Section 40 of the Child Care Act requires Commissioners of Child Welfare to 
take into consideration the child’s ‘religion and culture’. It will be very difficult for 
the court to have regard to these criteria when considering an application to 
place a child in another country as South African culture is arguably, unique. 
The argument of Heher JA on the question of subsidiarity is compelling indeed; 
that the child concerned was abandoned at birth, has no experience of a 
religious or cultural background other than that of the first and second 
respondents which is exactly the same as that of the applicants. The learned 
judge’s contention that the principle of subsidiarity is “very largely reduced in 
importance by these uncontested facts”, however loses sight of the fact that no 
effort was made to secure a home for the child within South Africa. The 
principle, as set out in the Preamble to the Convention, presupposes that the 
initial enquiry must be whether or not a suitable home is available for the child 
in the country of origin. It is only when this is exhausted that an adoption 
outside the country should be considered.   
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Theron AJA, in denouncing the efforts of the third respondent whose duty it was 
to attempt to secure suitable care for the child within South Africa, raises the 
point of the voice of the child. The learned judge says:   
 
Ruth’s voice has not been heard in this application. The third respondent, who 
ought to have represented Ruth’s best interests, has failed to do so.12  
 
 And in paragraph 25:  ...  
 
the third respondent, whose function it was to do so, aligned 
themselves with this application from the outset.   
 
Ponnan JA, echoes the need for the voice of the child to be heard in an 
application of this nature and finds that the appointment of a curator ad litem 
was indispensable in this case. He is clear in his assessment that the third 
respondent had “failed the child”.13    
 
It is clear that the roles of the child protection agencies and those facilitating the 
adoption services should remain separate and distinct. As Theron AJA has 
pointed out, the child protection agency that is tasked with ensuring the 
protection of the child and an outcome that is in the best interests of the child 
should not be accredited with providing inter-country adoption services as this 
will definitely blur the boundaries. A reading of section 258(2) of the Children’s 
Act together with section 259 permits this very anomaly to occur.14 The 
constitution and regulation of the functions of the Central Authority may be the 
only check in this untenable situation.   
 
It is exactly because these loopholes exist that any court needs to be extra 
vigilant in allowing a child to be removed from the country. In quoting the  
 
12  At par 21.  
13  Ponnan JA at par 95.  
14  S 258(2) states: “Any powers or duties of the Central Authority in terms of Articles 15 to 21 of the  
      Convention and sections 261(3) and (4), 262(3) and (4), 264(2) and 265(2) may, to the extent   
      determined by the Central Authority, be performed by:  
 a) another organ of state;  
b) a child protection organisation accredited in terms of section 259 to provide inter- country adoption 
services…”  
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Constitutional Court in Fitzpatrick, Theron AJA emphasises the greater burden 
that applicants face in such applications –    
 
until the new child care legislation is in operation and infrastructure 
and international agreements are put in place, prospective adoptive 
applicants ‘will have a greater burden in meeting the requirements of 
the Child Care Act than they will have thereafter’...   
 
The debate of what was in the best interests of little R clearly illustrated how the 
standard can indeed take on different shades:   
 
 • The appellants argued that if the application were to be refused, the 
    court would be placing the interests of the child secondary to depart- 
    mental policies and procedures.  
 •  In Fitzpatrick, Goldstone J stated that:  
 
…it is necessary that the [best interests] standard should be flexible 
as individual circumstances will determine which factors secure the 
best interests of a particular child.15    
 
 • Heher J found that:  
 
…while the interests of children generally are important they are only 
so to the extent that the child in this case will benefit or be adversely 
affected by the furtherance or limitation of those interests because 
this matter concerns the child R and no other. The peculiar facts of 
this case cannot be determinative or even persuasive of the rights of 
any other child whose interests are not the same.16 
 
The court, however, was not persuaded by this train of thought. After 
considering the best interests standard as set out in articles 3 and 21 of the 
UNCRC, and the Hague Convention, the court concluded that –    
 
these international instruments seek to protect the best interests of 
the child by ensuring, inter alia, that inter-country adoptions are 
conducted in a responsible and protective manner with the aim of 
eliminating the various abuses which have been associated with 
inter-country adoptions.   
 
15  Par 16.  
16  Par 33.  
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With respect, not only was this a more holistic and wide interpretation of the 
standard, but one that recognises the room for different types of abuse 
associated with inter-country adoptions which include the trafficking of children.  
 
The court was persuaded by arguments by the Centre for Child Law that 
entered the matter as amicus curiae. Ann Skelton, counsel for the Centre for 
Child Law, argued in written submissions before the court –    
 
By failing to proceed in terms of the Child Care Act, the Children’s 
Court is bypassed and South African children are removed from the 
country without a formal adoption having been sanctioned by the 
relevant local authorities. This places the children in a potentially 
vulnerable position, having left South Africa in terms of a 
guardianship and custody order granted in favour of potential 
adoptive parents.   
 
She argues further that once a child has been removed from the country, the 
South African courts lose its authority as upper guardian of that child. The child 
is thus left in a ‘legal limbo’, entirely dependant on the goodwill of the 
prospective adopters. This is perhaps the most compelling argument of what is 
in the best interests of a child facing an inter-country adoption. Certainty of the 
finalisation of the legal process of adoption in the child’s own country of birth 
will remain the safest means of ensuring the protection of the child outside the 
borders of the country of birth. This is what the finalisation of an adoption in the 
Children’s Court will ensure for the baby R, in this case, and for every other 
child facing the prospect of an inter-country adoption. As the sending country, it 
is also important for South Africa to send off the child with dignity and secure in 
the knowledge that the child’s rights are protected, and not to abandon South 
African children to the unknown legal processes of the receiving country.  
  
Ponnan JA, in a judgment that may sometimes only be described as lyrical 
prose, continues that whilst the “immediate allure of her being placed with the 
appellants is seductively appealing”,17 it falls short of the international principle 
of subsidiarity as the evidence fell short of establishing that there is an absence  
 
17  Par 96.  
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of prospective parents in this country for the child. As Ponnan JA concludes 
after examining the forum chosen by the appellants and the consequence that 
an order for the removal of the child to the United States will necessitate,    
 
...the child will be in a state of legal limbo. The security which comes 
with an adoption order is what the Hague Convention requires and 
the best interests of the child demands. To fashion relief that is less 
than that accorded to her by the Convention, is to my mind, the very 
antithesis of the best interests of the minor child.18   
 
It is clear from the judgment in De Gree that neither the appellants; the amicus 
curiae; nor any of the learned judges made any reference to the best interests 
of the child standard as set out in section 7 of the Children’s Act.19 Certainly, a 
reading of same indicates that the various clauses therein may have assisted 
the different parties in their respective efforts to give meaning to the elusive 
standard. Section 7 of the act lists the factors that must be taken into 
consideration when the best interests of the child standard must be applied. 
Some of the factors that are listed in the act and that may have assisted the 
parties in their respective arguments are the following:   
 
 (i)    the likely effect on the child of any change in the child’s 
                 circumstances, including the likely effect on the child of any  
                 separation from –   
        a) both or either of the parents;  
        b) any brother or sister or other child, or any other care-giver or       
            person, with whom the child has been living;  
 (ii)    the need for the child –  
        a) to remain in the care of his or her parent, family and extended 
            family; and  
        b) to maintain a connection with his or her family, extended family,   
            culture or tradition;  
 
 
 
18    Ponnan JA at par 98.  
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19   S 7 was one the sections of the Children’s Act that came into effect on 1 July 2007 as per Procl R13 
of 2007, signed on the 28 June 2007.  
 
 
 
 (iii)  the need for the child to be brought up in a stable family  
       environment and, where this is not possible, in an environment  
       resembling as closely as possible a caring family environment;  
 (iv) which action or decision would avoid or minimise further legal or 
       administrative proceedings in relation to the child.  
 
   
 3 Conclusion  
 
In traversing the area of inter-country adoption law against the background of 
the provisions of the international treaties, to which we are party, and the new 
Children’s Act, which is partly promulgated, we get a glimpse of what is ahead 
of us for the next few years as we give effect and meaning to the substance of 
the new legislation. The guidance and direction of the courts will be required in 
a clear and decisive manner even treading through murky waters as the 
majority judgment in this case did. Pending the promulgation of the regulations 
on the Children’s Act, especially in regard to inter-country adoptions, the 
relevant departments must work co-operatively to implement the practice 
guidelines20 that should aim to encourage rather than dissuade the legal 
profession from the simpler and more cost effective procedures contained in 
the Children’s Act.21    
 
20 Second Draft Guidelines for Inter-country Adoption, Nov 2006 – Department of Social Development.  
21 See also Burman (ed) Fate of the child; Davel (ed) Introduction to Child Law; Van Heerden, Cockrell  
      and Keightley (eds) Boberg’s Law of Persons.  
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